Governments across Africa are seeking to assert greater control over their mineral wealth by rewriting mining codes, demanding larger equity stakes or greater local participation, scrapping investment stability agreements and, in several cases, seizing assets outright.
Even Ghana, long considered the most stable mining district on the continent, has been subsumed by resource nationalism where nations seek greater beneficial control over their natural resources.
The reason is simple: gold is trading at around $5,000 per ounce, copper and many other critical minerals are benefiting from the surge towards renewable energy, and uranium is staging a comeback. Governments from Accra to Lusaka are stating that the deals struck with foreign miners a decade or two ago no longer feel fair.
Disputes between governments and investors over natural resources reached a 10-year high in 2025, with law firm DLA Piper recording 32 cases filed in the first 10 months of the year with the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Oil, gas, gold, uranium, and lithium all feature. “As their value has become more apparent, states have felt the need to exert greater control over any deposits of critical minerals within their borders,” writes Gabriela Alvarez-Avila, DLA Piper’s co-leader of international arbitration.
The trend is global, but it is in Africa, which holds a large share of the world’s gold, copper, cobalt, and uranium reserves and where much of these metals are mined, that the stakes appear highest and the methods more confrontational.
The surge in commodity prices has provided both the fiscal incentive and the political motivation for African governments to act. Gold – which traded at around $1,700/oz in 2020 – has more than tripled, breaching $5,000 in 2026 before settling at around $4,500 this year. At those prices, the royalty frameworks negotiated in leaner times look extraordinarily generous to foreign operators. Amid pressure from populists, governments are arguing that their countries deserve a fairer share.
Many African states are also under acute fiscal pressure, having emerged from the twin crises of the pandemic and post-pandemic inflation with constrained budgets and limited access to international capital markets. For governments in this position, the mining sector offers a politically palatable alternative to orthodox austerity.
In West Africa’s Sahel region, geopolitics has added a further dimension. Military juntas that have distanced themselves from Western partners and allied themselves with Vladimir Putin’s Russia have seen aid flows dry up and turned to their mineral wealth as a substitute source of revenue.
In extremis: The Sahel
Nowhere has resource nationalism been pursued more aggressively than in the Sahel region. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – three of the world’s poorest countries, yet rich in gold and uranium – military juntas have adopted policies that combine economics with intense nationalism and, at times, coercion.
In Mali, the 2023 mining code raised state and local ownership of mining projects from 20% to up to 35%, while boosting royalties from a maximum of 6.5% to 10%. The country’s junta, led by interim president Assimi Goïta, is applying the code with force: by late 2025 it had recovered an estimated $1.2bn in back payments from mining companies. Barrick Mining’s Loulo-Gounkoto mine – which contributes roughly 40% of Mali’s gold output – was suspended after a standoff that included the arrest of several Barrick employees and the issuance of an arrest warrant for its then CEO Mark Bristow. The standoff cost Barrick around $430m in settlement fees and an estimated $1.9bn in lost revenue. Mali, meanwhile, lost millions in taxes and royalties during the suspension. Gold production in the country fell 19% in 2025 to 81.2 tons.
If you are asking me what the (resource nationalism) trajectory is, I think it’s fair to say it is likely to be higher, but over the longer term’ – Ian Cockerill, Endeavour Mining
Burkina Faso, where a military government has been in power since 2020, enacted a new mining code in 2024 that raised the government’s free-carry stake in new mining projects from 10% to 15% and eliminated previously granted tax exemptions. The state has also taken direct control of mines: two gold operations previously owned by a UK-based firm, Boungou and Wahgnion, were acquired by the state mining company – reportedly below market value. In April this year Burkina Faso took a 35% stake in West African Resources’ newly commissioned Kiaka mine, in addition to the free-carry stake it had already increased to 15%.
In Niger, resource nationalism is the most confrontational of all. Emboldened by anti-French sentiment following the 2023 coup, the junta nationalised Somaïr, the country’s largest uranium mine majority-owned by French state company Orano. Some 1,000t of uranium stockpiles – valued at approximately €250m – were seized at the mine site, in apparent violation of an ICSID arbitration ruling. Several other mining and exploration licences were also revoked. The military government, which is strongly supported by Russia, has made no secret of its strategy that natural resources must serve the state first and foremost.
Southern comfort
In other African states the approach is less confrontational. Zambia, Africa’s second-largest copper producer, ZCCM Investments Holdings (ZCCM-IH), the state mining company, is actively seeking to raise its minority stakes in a range of mining operations – but has been explicit that it will do so on commercial terms and without forced sales. “There is clear intent for us to have substantial stakes in our existing mining assets,” CEO Kakenenwa Muyangwa told Reuters.
ZCCM-IH raised its stake in Lubambe Copper Mines to 30% last year and is currently increasing its holding in KoBold Metals’ Mingomba Mining from 20% to 25%. The company’s stated goal – tripling copper output to 3 million tons by 2031 – requires continued foreign investment and it has been cautious and encouraging in its dealings with mining multinationals. Where ZCCM-IH owns the licence, it expects a free-carry element of 5%-15%; after that, participation is negotiated commercially.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – home to roughly 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves and a significant share of global copper – has pursued a dual-track strategy. On one hand, Kinshasa has leveraged its critical mineral wealth as a geopolitical asset, engaging the US in a proposed minerals-for-security framework that would see US companies gain preferential access to Congolese cobalt, coltan, and rare earths in exchange for military support against M23 rebels. On the other hand, the DRC has tightened oversight of its mining sector through Gécamines, the state mining company, asserting stronger royalty enforcement and pushing for greater in-country processing.
Elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, the picture is mixed. Namibia is preparing a new minerals bill to replace legislation dating to 2002, aimed at expanding local beneficiation. Senegal is overhauling its mining code, having already revoked 71 mining licences. Zimbabwe has imposed export bans on lithium. Liberia is drafting a new mining code that would create a National Mining Company with equity stakes in major projects. The tide, while more measured in these countries, is clearly turning towards greater resource nationalism rather than investment promotion.
Trouble in Ghana
Of all the resource nationalism stories in Africa, the most consequential for multinational miners is playing out in Ghana – the continent’s largest gold producer. Ghana hosts operations of three of the world’s largest gold companies: Newmont, AngloGold Ashanti, and Gold Fields. It has long been considered the most investor friendly of mining jurisdictions in Africa and what happens there is watched closely in boardrooms and investment committees around the world.
In March 2026, Ghana implemented a new sliding-scale gold royalty framework, despite diplomatic opposition from the US, China, and several other Western governments. Under the new regime, royalties start at 5% when gold is priced at $1,900, rising to 12% at $4,500/oz. With spot gold trading above $4,500/oz at the time of writing, the highest rate now applies.
Alongside the new royalty regime, Ghana is phasing out long-term investment stability agreements by 2027. “Renewal of investment stability agreements is not going to happen,” Isaac Tandoh, CEO of the Minerals Commission, declared flatly. “Renewal is conditional, not automatic.”
A further regulatory measure involves the central bank, which is targeting 157t of gold holdings by 2028 and is pushing the three largest miners to hand over 30% of annual production in doré form – up from an existing commitment of 20% that was itself only half-met. This will encourage in-country processing through local refineries and route all exports through a newly formed gold trading company.
Critically, Ghana’s reforms extend well beyond royalties and in-country refining. In January 2025, the government revised local ownership rules requiring all surface mining operations to be undertaken by fully Ghanaian-owned firms, and underground operations by companies with at least 50% Ghanaian ownership. By April 2026, the Minerals Commission had given Newmont, AngloGold Ashanti, and Zijin – the only major companies still self-operating – until December 2026 to comply or face sanctions including potential mine closure.
Done well, resource nationalism could represent a step change in economic growth. Done poorly, it could spook investment and undermine confidence at the very time it is most needed – Rohitesh Dhawan, ICMM, and Ronak Gopaldas, Signal Risk
S&P Global’s Jason Holden calls it resource nationalism by regulation. “By mandating that all mining operations be conducted by Ghana-owned contractors, effectively separating the license holder from the physical act of mining,” he writes in an article published by S&P Global Market Intelligence.
“The result is a transfer of control – and the economic value that flows from it – from foreign mining companies to domestic firms without the headline risk or legal complexity of expropriation.”
Ghana’s new approach to resource nationalism could achieve many of the same economic objectives of full nationalisation while avoiding the catastrophic production collapses previously seen in Zambia and the DRC, he adds.
The most dramatic illustration of Ghana’s new strategy is the fate of Gold Fields’ Damang mine and the looming uncertainty over its vastly more important Tarkwa operation. In 2025, Ghana’s government declined to renew the mining licence for Damang, instead awarding it to local contractor Engineers & Planners (E&P) – a company owned by Ibrahim Mahama, brother of President John Dramani Mahama, and which is also the mining contractor at Tarkwa. A compromise was reached under which Gold Fields agreed to cede the mine in 2026 after conducting a life-of-mine feasibility study. On April 18, E&P took formal control at Damang.
Gold Fields had originally intended to close the open pit and process its remaining stockpiles. The fact that it agreed to fund a feasibility study for an asset it would no longer own is in itself revealing – and the reason is Tarkwa. The Tarkwa mine is a cornerstone asset, contributing 17% of current group gold production, with expansion plans that could lift that share to above 20%. Its mining leases over the property expire in 2027.
The current renegotiation of tenure and fiscal terms must be resolved by early 2027, when the current lease expires. The issue is further complicated by a conflict with E&P over disputed contractor claims of $740m. Government has stated that Gold Fields’ future plans for the mine will be fully scrutinised before any renewal is granted, the company is not taking anything for granted. Gold Fields has formed a special board committee to manage the process and has raised its public profile in the country, sponsoring the national football teams and showcasing its significant investment in host communities. CEO Mike Fraser says Ghana is treating Gold Fields as “a guinea pig”.
The renewal of the lease has sparked a vigorous debate in the country. The Institute for Economic Affairs says Tarkwa’s lease expiry represents “a rare and historic opportunity” to reclaim the asset for Ghanaian ownership. The Ghana Chamber of Mines however warns that any such move would have devastating consequences. “Their proposal will destroy the security of tenure that is essential to the development and sustenance of the mining industry,” Kenneth Ashigbey, CEO of the chamber said at a press conference in May 2026.
The chamber has sought to affirm the government’s right to reform while insisting on due process and procedural fairness. “These procedural protections underpin the rule of law and investor confidence in Ghana’s mining sector, and they must not be disregarded,” Ashigbey said in a formal statement. He warned that uncertainty surrounding Tarkwa “could have wider implications for employment, host communities and Ghana’s attractiveness to international investors”.
Investors are clearly concerned. UBS analysts have noted that Tarkwa’s 2027 licence reset “is likely to revisit both tenure and fiscal terms, increasing risks around a higher government stake, tighter local participation requirements, and greater state influence”. They warned: “With Damang now a clear precedent, renewal outcomes appear increasingly binary.”
Reckoning
While African governments will celebrate the boost in revenue, the longer-term impact on much-needed foreign investment could be dire. Metals Focus has warned that Ghana’s policy trajectory will likely prompt “a more cautious approach to capital investment, with a potential review of greenfield projects and a prioritisation of staged, brownfield expansions”. Beyond that, the research firm noted, investors will think twice before committing to new projects.
The Fraser Institute’s 2025 annual survey of mining companies already placed Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Angola among the 10 least investment-attractive jurisdictions globally – a ranking that costs those countries real capital. (See graph).
Ian Cockerill, CEO of Endeavour Mining, which has operations in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, said at a results presentation late last year that fiscal changes – driven by record-high gold prices – were inevitable. “If you are asking me what the (resource nationalism) trajectory is, I think it’s fair to say it is likely to be higher, but over the longer term,” he said. The question is whether that trajectory can be managed in a way that preserves the investment case.
Resource nationalism has a disastrous track record in Africa: in the short term, states can extract more from existing operations. In the long run, if the terms become too onerous, the investment in new projects dries up, and future revenues fall. The collapse of the Zambian copper industry after it was nationalised by the socialist government in the 1970s is a well-established case study. Today’s strong gold price partially masks that trade-off in that companies can absorb higher royalties and taxes while continuing to generate returns. But it also means that when the price eventually corrects, or when one jurisdiction pushes the terms too far, the pullback in capital could be swift and severe.
Ghana’s government has moved to reassure investors: the Lands and Natural Resources Minister travelled to New York in May 2026 to market Ghana as “Africa’s premier mining investment destination”, pointing to the country’s legal framework and promising no retroactive changes. The contradiction between that message and the treatment of Gold Fields has not been lost on the investment community.
Zambia’s current approach and Botswana’s new partnership deal with De Beers in February 2025 have been welcomed as they showcase that resource nationalism need not be a zero-sum game. A settlement that genuinely shares value – rather than simply transferring it from one party to another – is achievable, and the continent has a few examples of it being done well. But the prevailing mood in much of sub-Saharan Africa is one of assertion rather than partnership.
This approach is partially understandable. Africa’s mineral wealth is substantial, the prices are extraordinarily high, and the historical terms of many mining agreements were loaded in favour of foreign mining companies. But without security of tenure and the confidence that a contract will be honoured not only by current but also by future governments, it becomes very difficult to justify the multibillion-dollar, multi-decade investments that large-scale mining requires.
As the scramble for minerals and metals intensifies around the globe, the country that manages to offer both a fair share and a predictable framework will attract the capital. As Rohitesh Dhawan, CEO of the International Council of Mining and Metals and Ronak Gopaldas of Signal Risk observed in an article last year: “Done well, resource nationalism could represent a step change in economic growth”. Done poorly, it “could spook investment and undermine confidence at the very time it is most needed”.
